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This paper gives an overview on and summarizes existing complexity and algorithmic results
of some variants of the Stable Marriage and the Stable Roommates problems. The last
section defines a list of stable matching problems mentioned in the paper. If you find any
corrections, suggestions, new or missing results, please send them to jiehua.chen2@gmail.com.
1 Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates
Stable Roommates deals with the division of human or non-human agents (classically called
roommates) into pairs, where each agent has a preference list on who is more preferable as a
partner. In Stable Roommates, we are given a set of agents U , each having a preference
list ≻ (a linear order on U), indicating which other it prefers to have as partner, The goal of
Stable Roommates is to search for a matching , i.e. a set of disjoint pairs of U , that contains
no blocking pairs. Herein, a blocking pair is a pair of two agents u and w who are not matched
together such that
(i) u is either unmatched by M or prefers w to its partner M(u), i.e. w ≻u M(u), and
(ii) w is either unmatched by M or prefers u to its partner M(w), i.e. u ≻w M(w).
We call such a matching a stable matching and we call it perfect if every agent is assigned
a partner. An even more well-known problem—Stable Marriage, is a bipartite, restricted
variant of Stable Roommates, where the agents are partitioned into two disjoint subsets such
that each agent has preferences over the agents of the opposite subset and can only be assigned
a partner from that subset. Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates are introduced in
the field of Economics and Computer Science in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively [27, 49]. They
have since been studied extensively by not only economists but also computer scientists and
social and political scientists [49, 41, 42, 52, 32, 54, 6].
Practical applications of Stable Roommates as well as Stable Marriage (and their
variants) include partnership issues in the real-world [27], allocating items (e.g. time-slots, loca-
tions, or resources) to agents (e.g. event hosts or individuals), where the agents have preferences
over the available items [37, 5, 20], centralized automated mechanisms that assign children to
schools [3, 4], school graduates to universities [9, 11], or medical students to hospitals [1, 2],
grouping people to share a room or pairing participants for chess tournaments or in P2P net-
works [50, 51, 26], scheduling user jobs to machines so that users do not want to switch to
some other machines, and finding receiver-donor pairs for organ transplants (for more details,
see the work of Manlove and O’Malley [55] and Roth et al. [63, 62].
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1.1 When preferences are beyond complete linear orders
Varying from application to application, the preferences of the agents in Stable Roommates
and Stable Marriage could be incomplete, meaning that not every agent is an acceptable
partner to every agent of the opposite sex. This corresponds to the case where the underlying
acceptance graph is bipartite yet incomplete. The preferences of the agents may also contain
ties, meaning that two agents are considered to be equally good as a partner. Note that for
preferences with ties, our stability concept is regarded as weak stability since it suffices to forbid
the existence of unmatched pairs that strictly prefer to be with each other. There are two other
popular stability concepts–strong stability and super stability. A matching is called strongly
stable if no unmatched pair {u,w} exists such that (i) u is either unmatched or finds w at least
as good as its assigned partner M(u) (denoted as w u M(u)), and (ii) w is either unmatched
or prefers u to its assigned partner M(w) (denoted as u ≻w M(w)). A matching is called super
stable if no unmatched pair {u,w} exists such that (i) u is either unmatched or finds w at least
as good as its assigned partner M(u) (denoted as w u M(u)), and (ii) w is either unmatched
or finds w at least as good as its assigned partner M(w) (denoted as u w M(w)). We refer to
the works of Gusfield and Irving [32], Manlove [54] for more detailed discussions. In this paper,
unless stated explicitly, we always write stable matchings to refer to weakly stable matchings.
For preferences without ties, even when they are incomplete, deciding whether a Stable
Roommates with Incomplete Preferences instance with n agents admits a stable match-
ing and finding one if it exists can be done in O(n2) time, for both Stable Roommates and
Stable Marriage [27, 38]. However, when preferences have ties, Stable Roommates be-
comes NP-hard [61] even if the preferences are complete. The situation for Stable Marriage
seems more positive: It still admits a stable matching, even for incomplete preferences. But,
there could be stable matchings with different sizes. By breaking the ties arbitrarily, one can
use the algorithm of [39] to find a stable matching.
The corresponding computational problems are defined as Stable Roommates with In-
complete Preferences (SRI) and Stable Marriage with Incomplete Preferences (SMI),
Stable Roommates with Ties and Complete Preferences (SRT) and Stable Mar-
riage with Ties and Complete Preferences (SMT), and Stable Roommates with
Ties and Incomplete Preferences (SRTI) and Stable Marriage with Ties and In-
complete Preferences (SMTI).
1.2 When preferences satisfy structural properties
The original stable roommate problem strives to pair up roommates who prefer to stay with
each other. In this setting, the roommates’ preferences over who is more suitable to stay with
may display some specific structure. For instance, from the psychological point of view, it is
natural to assume that individuals are narcissistic, meaning that they like to be with someone
who resembles themselves. Furthermore, as different individuals may e.g. have different ideal
room temperatures, the preferences of an individual may display the so-called single-peaked
property : individuals will prefer those whose ideal room temperature is close to their own over
those whose temperature of choice is further away.
Bartholdi III and Trick [10] showed that when the input preferences are linear, narcissistic
(i.e. each agent ranks itself at the first position), and single-peaked (i.e. there is a linear order of
the agents such that each agent’s preferences over the agents along this order are either strictly
increasing, strictly decreasing, or first strictly increasing and then strictly decreasing), then a
Stable Roommates (SR) instance with 2n agents always admits a unique stable matching
and it can be found in sublinear time (O(n)). Bredereck et al. [15] showed that the same holds
when the given instance is linear, complete, narcissistic, and single-crossing (i.e. there is a linear
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Marriage Setting
Objective Without ties With ties
Parameter
Any Stable O(n2) [38, 32] O(n2) [39]
Max Cardinality - NP-c (perfect) [53]
Max. list length ℓ - NP-c (ℓ = 3) [45]
Cardinality τ - O(τ τ ), size-O(τ2) kern [8]
Unmatched agents nu = 2n− 2τ - NP-c (nu = 0) [53]
Min Cardinality - NP-c [53]
Matching cardinality τˆ - O(τˆ τˆ ), size-O(τˆ2) kern [8]
Unmatched agents nu = 2n− 2τˆ - ?
Egalitarian P [44, 31] NP-c (even for compl. prefs) [53]
Egal. cost γ = pref. list length - γO(γ) · nO(1) [17]
Max. list length ℓ - NP-c (ℓ = 5) [16]
Min Regret P [44, 31] NP-c [53, 33]
Max. list length ℓ - NP-c (ℓ = 3) [21]
regret cost λ - NP-c (λ = 2, perfect) implied by [45]
regret cost λ - ? for any stable matching
Sex-Equal NP-c [48] NP-c [48]
Sex-equal cost ρ NP-c (ρ = 0, ℓ = 3) [57] NP-c (ρ = 0, ℓ = 3) [57]
Max. list length ℓ O(n3) (ℓ ≤ 2 on one side) [57] ?
Balanced NP-c [24] NP-c [24]
Balance cost α FPT (implied by [29]) ?
Min Man-Exchange NP-c [40] NP-c [40]
Exchanges θ NP-c (θ = 0) [40] *
Max. list length ℓ P (ℓ = 2) [40], NP-c (θ = 0, ℓ = 4) [58] *
Popular P [28] NP-c [7]
Matching cardinality P [36] NP-c [7]
Table 1: Complexity of the various variants of Stable Marriage. “-” means that the corre-
sponding parameter is irrelevant for fixed-parameter tractability but may be interesting for the
FPT-in-P research. “∗” means that the hardness result for the case without ties transfer to the
case with ties.
order of the agents such that for each pair of agents {x, y}, there are at most two consecutive
agents along the order that disagree over the relative order of x and y).
When ties are present but the preferences remain complete, Bredereck et al. [15] managed
to show that the in general NP-hard Stable Roommates with Ties and Complete Pref-
erences problem [61] becomes polynomial-time solvable. However, when incompleteness also
comes into play, Stable Roommates with Ties and Complete Preferences remains
NP-hard even if the input preferences are narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize results of (variants of) Stable Marriage and Stable Room-
mates for two aspects, without and with ties.
Besides the relevant work mentioned in the paper, there are some other research regarding
the parameterized complexity of preference-based stable matching problems [30, 18, 19].
2 Optimization variants
As noted in the introduction, some Stable Roommates instances do not admit any stable
matching at all, and in fact, empirical study suggests that a constant fraction of all sufficiently
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Roommates Setting
Objective Without ties With ties
Parameter
Any Stable O(n2) [38, 32] NP-c [61]
max. list length ℓ - NP-c (ℓ = 3) [21]
Min Block-Pairs NP-c [6] NP-c (β = 0) [61]
Blocking pairs β XP [6], W[1]-h (ℓ = 5) [17] NP-c (β = 0, ℓ = 3) [14]
Min Block-Agents NP-c [17] NP-c (η = 0) [61]
Blocking agents η XP, W[1]-h (ℓ = 5) [17] NP-c (η = 0) [61]
Min Delete P [64] NP-c (δ = 0) [61]
Deleted agents δ - NP-c (δ = 0) [61]
Remaining agents - FPT [16]
Max Cardinality P [32] NP-c [61, 53]
Matching cardinality τ - NP-c (τ = 1) [61, 53]
Unmatched agents nu = n− 2τ - NP-c (nu = 0) [53]
Size of a max. matching - FPT, poly. kern [8]
Egalitarian NP-c [25] NP-c [61]
Egalitarian cost γ
Unmatched agents’ costs
= pref. list length O(2γ · n2), size-O(γ2) kern. [17] γO(γ) · nO(1) [17]
= a constant O(2γ · n2), size-O(γ2) kern. [17] W[1]-h, XP [17]
= 0 O(2γ · n2), size-O(γ2) kern. [17] NP-c (γ = 0) [17]
Max. list length ℓ NP-c (ℓ = 3) [21] *
Min Regret P [32] NP-c [53]
Max. list length ℓ - NP-c (ℓ = 3) [21]
regret cost λ - NP-c (λ = 2) implied by [21]
Popular NP-c [59, 23] *
Table 2: Complexity of the various variants of Stable Roommates. “-” means that the
corresponding parameter is irrelevant for fixed-parameter tractability but may be interesting
for the FPT-in-P research. “∗” means that the hardness result for the case without ties transfer
to the case with ties.
large instances will have no solution [60]. Moreover, even if a given Stable Roommates
instance admits a stable matching, this solution may not be unique, and there might be solutions
with which the agents are more satisfied than with others and thus, are more desirable than
others. Given these two facts, it makes sense to consider two types of optimization variants for
Stable Roommates: In one type one would want to compute stable matching that optimize a
certain social criteria; in the other, one would want to compute matchings with optimal distance
or closeness to stability.
2.1 Socially optimal stable matchings
For the case when more than one stable matching exists, it is desirable to compute a stable
matching that is socially most satisfactory. Herein, the satisfaction of an agent x with respect to
a given stable matching typically depends on the rank of its partner y assigned by this matching,
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which is the number of agents that are strictly preferred to y by x.
A stable matching is regarded as socially optimal if
- the sum of the ranks of all partners (i.e., the egalitarian cost γ) is minimum, or
- the maximum rank of any partner is (i.e., the regret cost λ) is minimum.
Accordingly, we define the egalitarian cost and the regret cost of a matching M as
egal-cost(M) :=
∑
{i,j}∈M
(ranki(j) + rankj(i)), and
regret-cost(M) := max
i∈V (M)
ranki(M(j)).
We call the corresponding optimization problems in the roommates setting Egalitarian
Stable Roommates and Min Regret Stable Roommates (see Section 3 for the formal
definitions) and in the marriage setting Egalitarian Stable Marriage and Min Regret
Stable Marriage.
2.1.1 Egalitarian cost and regret cost
When the input preferences do not have ties (but could be incomplete), Egalitarian Stable
Marriage and Min Regret Stable Marriage are solvable in O(n4) time [44].
For preferences with ties, both Egalitarian Stable Marriage andMin Regret Stable
Marriage become NP-hard [53]. Thus, already in the bipartite case, it becomes apparent that
allowing ties in preference lists makes the task of computing an optimal egalitarian matching
much more challenging. Marx and Schlotter [56] showed, among other results, that Egalitar-
ian Stable Marriage and Min Regret Stable Marriage are fixed-parameter tractable
when parameterized by the parameter “sum of the lengths of all ties”. Halldo´rsson et al. [33]
showed inapproximability results for each of both problems. Irving et al. [45] showed that find-
ing a perfect stable matching in a Stable Marriage instance with ties is NP-hard, even when
the length of each preference list is bounded by three and the ties occur only on one side. It is
obvious that in the same setting, finding a perfect stable matching with minimum regret two
(note that we defined the regret cost to be the maximum rank of the partner of any agent)
remains NP-hard.
For Egalitarian Stable Roommates, Feder [25] showed that the problem is NP-hard
even if the preferences are complete and have no ties, and gave a 2-approximation algorithm
for this case. Cseh et al. [21] studied Egalitarian Stable Roommates for preferences with
bounded length ℓ and without ties. They showed that the problem is polynomial-time solvable
if ℓ = 2, and is NP-hard for ℓ ≥ 3. They also showed that finding an arbitrary stable matching
for a Stable Roommates instance with ties is NP-hard for ℓ = 3. This immediately implies
thatMin Regret Stable Roommates with ties is NP-hard even for regret cost at most three.
2.1.2 Other costs
For Stable Marriage, there are two more measures on socially optimal stable matchings: It
may be desirable to find
- a sex-equal stable matching, which minimizes absolute value of the difference between the
sums of the ranks of one side (i.e., the sex-equal cost ρ),
- a balanced stable matching, which minimizes the maximum of the sums of the ranks of one
side (i.e. the balance cost α), and
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- a min. man-exchange stable matching M , which minimizes the number θ of man-exchange
pairs; a pair of two men u and u′ is called a man-exchange pair in M , if they prefer the
respective agent’s partner to their own partner: M(u′) ≻u M(u) and M(u) ≻u′ M(u
′).
Accordingly, we define the equal-cost, the balance-cost, the exchange-cost of a matching M as
equal-cost(M) :=
∣∣∣
∑
(u,w)∈M
ranku(w)−
∑
(u,w)∈M
rankw(u)
∣∣∣,
balance-cost(M) := max
( ∑
(u,w)∈M
(rankm(w),
∑
(u,w)∈M
rankw(u)
)
, and
exchange-cost(M) := |{{u, u′} ⊆ U |M(u′) ≻u M(u) ∧M(u) ≻u′ M(u
′)}|.
We call the corresponding optimization problems Sex-Equal Stable Marriage problem [48,
57], Balanced Stable Marriage [24], and Min Man-Exchange Stable Marriage [40,
58]. All three problems are NP-complete, even when ties are not present [48, 24, 40].
McDermid and Irving [57] showed Sex-Equal Stable Marriage is NP-complete, even if
no ties are present and the preference list of each agent has length at most three. When ties
are present, its optimization variant cannot be approximated within arbitrary constant factor
unless P = NP [34].
When ties are not present, with respect to the parameter t, which is “the balance cost α plus
the number of matched men”, it is straight-forward to verify that Balanced Stable Mar-
riage is fixed-parameter tractable. Thus, Gupta et al. [29] studied parameterized complexity
of Balanced Stable Marriage with respect to two parameters that measure that distance
to the parameter t. They showed that for the first one it admits a kernel and for the second
one it is W[1]-hard.
McDermid et al. [58] showed thatMin Man-Exchange Stable Marriage is NP-complete
even without ties and when the preference list of each agent has length at most four.
2.2 Distance/closeness to stable matchings
For the case when no stable matchings exist, the agents may still be satisfied with a matching
that is close to being stable. Such closeness could be measured, for example,
- by the cardinality τ of a stable matching,
- by the number δ of agents whose exclusion (by deleting these agents and their presence in all
preference lists) allows perfect stability,
- by the number β of blocking pairs,
- by the number η of blocking agents (agents involved in blocking pairs), or
- by the number φ of agents that prefer this matching to any other matching.
The corresponding problems regarding the above measurements are denoted as Max-Card
Stable Roommates,Min-Delete Stable Roommates,Min-Block-Pairs Stable Room-
mates, and Min-Block-Agents Stable Roommates (see Section 3 for the formal defini-
tions). We now list results regarding the complexity of these optimization problems.
2.2.1 Cardinality
When the preferences may have ties, Stable Roommates becomes NP-hard [61], even if the
input has complete preferences, implying that Min-Delete Stable Roommates, Max-Card
Stable Roommates, and Min-Block-Pairs Stable Roommates are all NP-hard in this
case as well.
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The closely related Max-Card Stable Marriage (Max-SM) problem (where the pref-
erences are incomplete and have ties) is NP-hard, even if (1) the ties are at the tails of the
lists and occur on one side only, (2) each list has at most one tie, and (3) each tie is of length
two [53].
Max-SM has been extensively studied: When on one side, the preference list of each agent
has at most two agents, Irving et al. [45] showed that Max-SM can be solved in polynomial
time by using a simple extension of the Gale/Shapley algorithm for the case without ties. They
compliment this tractability result by showing that even if each agent finds at most three agents
acceptable, Max-SM is NP-complete.
There are both constant-factor approximation algorithms and inapproximability results for
the problem [33, 34, 43, 53, 47, 46]. In particular, Halldo´rsson et al. [34] showed that both
the maximization and the minimization variant of Max-SM is NP-hard to approximate within
some constant factor. The result holds even if the preference lists have bounded length, and
there is at most one tie per list, and the ties occur on one side only.
Marx and Schlotter [56] studied the parameterized complexity of Max-Card Stable Mar-
riage for parameters that are related to ties and showed that the problem is W[1]-hard with
respect to the number of ties of the given instance. Recently, Adil et al. [8] studied parameter-
ized complexity of Max-Card Stable Marriage and Max-Card Stable Roommates. In
particular, they showed that Max-Card Stable Marriage parameterized by the cardinal-
ity τ of a maximum stable matching and Max-Card Stable Roommates parameterized by
the size of a maximum matching are fixed-parameter tractable.
2.2.2 Deleting agents
Note that by our definition of stability, a matching which leaves two agents unmatched can
never be stable so that a stable matching resulting from precluding δ agents in general cannot
guarantee a stable matching with cardinality (n− δ)/2.
For preferences without ties, Tan [64] proposed a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a
perfect stable matching in a Stable Roommates instance without ties, after deleting the fewest
possible number of agents in an SR instance, showing that Min-Delete Stable Roommates
is polynomial-time solvable. When ties are allowed, since it is already NP-hard to decide whether
an SR instance admit an arbitrary stable matching, Min-Delete Stable Roommates with
ties NP-hard even if δ = 0. Chen et al. [16] showed that Min-Delete Stable Roommates
with ties is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the dual parameter “number of agents
remained in the stable matching”.
2.2.3 Blocking pairs and blocking agents
Abraham et al. [6] showed that Min-Block-Pairs Stable Roommates is NP-hard, and
cannot be approximated within a factor of n0.5−ε unless P = NP, even if the given preferences
are complete. They also showed that the problem can be solved in nO(β) time, where n and β
denote the number of agents and the number of blocking pairs, respectively. This implies that
the problem is in the parameterized complexity class XP for parameter β. Biro´ et al. [14] showed
that the problem is NP-hard and APX-hard even if each agent has a preference list of length
at most 3, and presented a (2ℓ − 3)-approximation algorithm for bounded list length ℓ. Biro´
et al. [13] and Hamada et al. [35] showed that the related variant of Stable Marriage, where
the goal is to find a matching with minimum blocking pairs among all maximum-cardinality
matchings, cannot be approximated within n1−ε unless P = NP.
Chen et al. [17] showed that Min-Block-Pairs Stable Roommates parameterized by
the number β of blocking pairs and Min-Block-Agents Stable Roommates parameterized
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by the number η are W[1]-hard even if the length of the preference lists is bounded by five.
2.2.4 Popular matchings
Ga¨rdenfors [28] introduced the notion of majority assignments which is more widely known
as popular matchings [7] and corresponds to the notion of weak Condorcet winners in voting
theory [22]. Given two matchings, M1 and M2, and an agent x, we say that x prefers M1 to
M2 if it holds that either x is matched in M1 but unmatched in M2 or M1(x) ≻x M2(x). A
matching M is called popular if for each matching M ′ it holds that the number of agents that
prefer M to M ′ is no less than the number of agents that prefer M ′ to M .
For preferences without ties, one can verify that every stable matching is popular. Since
a Stable Marriage instance always admits a stable matching, every Stable Marriage
is a yes instance for the popular matching question. Huang and Kavitha [36] presented a
polynomial-time algorithm which finds a popular matching with maximum cardinality in Sta-
ble Marriage for preferences without ties. Very recently, Misra et al. [59], Faenza et al. [23]
showed that in the roommate settings, even without ties, the problem of finding a popular
matching is NP-hard.
For preferences with ties, Abraham et al. [7] showed that deciding whether a Stable Mar-
riage instance admits a popular matching is NP-complete, but it is polynomial-time solvable
when only one side has ties. Biro´ et al. [12] showed that for the roommates setting with ties,
both finding a perfect popular matching and finding a perfect popular matching are NP-hard.
3 Problem definitions
Every problem described starting from 5 is defined for the roommates setting without ties. It
can be restricted to the marriage case and generalized to the case with ties. However, for some
of the problems, we need to carefully adjust the measurement to also tackle the cost of agents
that are unmatched.
1. Stable Marriage
Input: Two disjoint sets U = {u1, u2, . . . , un} and W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} of n agents
each, and each agent u ∈ U (resp. w ∈ W ) has a preference list ≻u (resp. ≻w) over U
(resp. over W ).
Question: Does U ⊎W admit a stable matching?
2. Stable Roommates
Input: A set U = {u1, u2, . . . , u2n} of 2n agents, and each agent u ∈ U has a preference
list ≻u over (a subset of) U .
Question: Does U admit a stable matching?
3. Variants: Stable Marriage with complete preferences but without ties (SM), Stable
Marriage with complete preferences and with ties (SMT), Stable Marriage with
incomplete preferences and without ties (SMI), Stable Marriage with incomplete pref-
erences and with ties (SMTI)
4. Variants: Stable Roommates with complete preferences but without ties (SR), Stable
Roommates with complete preferences and with ties (SRT), Stable Roommates with
incomplete preferences and without ties (SRI), Stable Roommates with incomplete
preferences and with ties (SRTI)
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5. Min-Block-Pairs Stable Roommates (Min-BP-SR)
Input: A Stable Roommates instance I and a number β ∈ N.
Question: Does I admit a matching with at most β blocking pairs?
6. Min-Block-Agents Stable Roommates (Min-BA-SR)
Input: A Stable Roommates instance I and a number η ∈ N.
Question: Does I admit a matching with at most η blocking agents?
7. Max-Card Stable Roommates (Max-Size-SR)
Input: A Stable Roommates instance I and a number τ ∈ N.
Question: Does I admit a stable matching with cardinality at least τ?
8. Min-Card Stable Roommates (Min-Size-SR)
Input: A Stable Roommates instance I and a number τˆ ∈ N.
Question: Does I admit a stable matching with cardinality at most τˆ?
9. Min-Delete Stable Roommates (Del-SR)
Input: A Stable Roommates instance I and a number δ ∈ N.
Question: Is there a matching which is stable for the instance obtained by deleting at
most δ agents?
10. Egalitarian Stable Roommates (Egal-SR)
Input: A Stable Roommates instance I and a number γ ∈ N.
Question: Does I admit a stable matching M with egal-cost at most γ, i.e.
∑
u∈U
ranku(M(u)) ≤ γ?
Here, ranku(M(u)) is defined as the number of agents that are preferred to M(u) by u.
11. Min Regret Stable Roommates (Regret-SR)
Input: A Stable Roommates instance I and a number λ ∈ N.
Question: Does I admit a stable matching with regret-cost at most λ, i.e.
max
u∈U
ranku(M(u)) ≤ λ?
Here, ranku(M(u)) is defined as the number of agents that are preferred to M(u) by u.
12. Sex-Equal Stable Marriage (SESM)
Input: A Stable Marriage instance I with sets U and W , and a number ρ ∈ N.
Question: Does I admit a stable matching with equal-cost at most ρ, i.e.
∣∣∣
∑
(u,w)∈M
ranku(w) −
∑
(u,w)∈M
rankw(u)
∣∣∣ ≤ ρ?
13. Balanced Stable Marriage (BSM)
Input: A Stable Marriage instance I with sets U and W , and a number α ∈ N.
Question: Does I admit a stable matching with balance-cost at most α, i.e.
∑
(u,w)∈M
ranku(w) ≤ α and
∑
(u,w)∈M
rankw(u) ≤ α?
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14. Min Man-Exchange Stable Marriage (MESM)
Input: A Stable Marriage instance I with sets U and W , and a number θ ∈ N.
Question: Does I admit a stable matching with exchange-cost at most θ. i.e.
|{{u, u′} ⊆ U |M(u′) ≻u M(u) ∧M(u) ≻u′ M(u
′)}| ≤ θ?
Here, a pair of two agents u, u′ ∈ U is a man-exchange pair if they prefer the respective
agent’s partner to their own partner: M(u′) ≻u M(u) and M(u) ≻u′ M(u
′).
15. Popular Matching in Stable Roommates
Input: A Stable Roommates instance I with agent set U .
Question: Does I admit a popular matching M , i.e.
∀ matching M ′ : |{u ∈ U |M(u) ≻u M
′(u)}| ≥ |{u ∈ U |M ′(u) ≻u M(u)}|?
10
References
[1] URL http://www.nrmp.org. National Resident Matching Program website. → p. 1.
[2] URL http://www.nes.scot.nhs.uk/sfas. Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme web-
site. → p. 1.
[3] A. Abdulkadirogˇlu, P. A. Pathak, and A. E. Roth. The Boston public school match.
American Economic Review, 95(2):368––371, 2005. → p. 1.
[4] A. Abdulkadirogˇlu, P. A. Pathak, and A. E. Roth. The New York City high school match.
American Economic Review, 95(2):364–367, 2005. → p. 1.
[5] D. Abraham, N. Chen, V. Kumar, and V. S. Mirrokni. Assignment problems in rental
markets. In Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Internet and Network
Economics (WINE ’06), pages 198–213, 2006. → p. 1.
[6] D. J. Abraham, P. Biro´, and D. Manlove. “Almost stable” matchings in the roommates
problem. In Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Approximation and Online
Algorithms (WAOA ’05), pages 1–14, 2005. → pp. 1, 4, and 7.
[7] D. J. Abraham, R. W. Irving, T. Kavitha, and K. Mehlhorn. Popular matchings. SIAM
Journal on Computing, 37(4):1030–1045, 2007. → pp. 3 and 8.
[8] D. Adil, S. Gupta, S. Roy, S. Saurabh, and M. Zehavi. Parameterized algorithms for stable
matching with ties and incomplete lists. Theoretical Computer Science, 723:1–10, 2018.
→ pp. 3, 4, and 7.
[9] M. Ba¨ıou and M. Balinski. Student admissions and faculty recruitment. Theoretical Com-
puter Science, 322(2):245–265, 2004. → p. 1.
[10] J. J. Bartholdi III and M. Trick. Stable matching with preferences derived from a psycho-
logical model. Operation Research Letters, 5(4):165–169, 1986. → p. 2.
[11] P. Biro´ and S. Kiselgof. College admissions with stable score-limits. Central European
Journal of Operations Research, 23(4):727–741, 2015. → p. 1.
[12] P. Biro´, R. W. Irving, and D. Manlove. Popular matchings in the marriage and roommates
problems. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
(CIAC ’10), pages 97–108, 2010. → p. 8.
[13] P. Biro´, D. Manlove, and S. Mittal. Size versus stability in the marriage problem. Theo-
retical Computer Science, 411(16-18):1828–1841, 2010. → p. 7.
[14] P. Biro´, D. Manlove, and E. McDermid. “Almost stable” matchings in the Roommates
problem with bounded preference lists. Theoretical Computer Science, 432:10–20, 2012.
→ pp. 4 and 7.
[15] R. Bredereck, J. Chen, U. P. Finnendahl, and R. Niedermeier. Stable roommate with
narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing preferences. In Proceedings of the 5th Inter-
national Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT ’17), pages 315–330. Springer,
2017. → pp. 2 and 3.
[16] J. Chen, D. Hermelin, M. Sorge, and H. Yedidsion. Parameterized stable matchings, 2018.
working paper. → pp. 3, 4, and 7.
11
[17] J. Chen, D. Hermelin, M. Sorge, and H. Yedidsion. How hard is it to satisfy (almost) all
roommates? In Proceedings of the 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages,
and Programming (ICALP ’18), pages 35:1–35:15, 2018. → pp. 3, 4, and 7.
[18] J. Chen, R. Niedermeier, and P. Skowron. Stable marriage with multi-modal preferences.
Technical report, arXiv:1801.02693 [cs.MA,cs.DS], 2018. → p. 3.
[19] J. Chen, P. Skowron, and M. Sorge. Matchings under preferences: Strength of stability
and trade-offs. Technical report, arXiv:1902.10535 [cs.GT], 2019. → p. 3.
[20] Y. Chen and T. So¨nmez. Improving efficiency of on-campus housing: An experimental
study. American Economic Review, 92(5):1669—-1686, 2002. → p. 1.
[21] A´. Cseh, R. W. Irving, and D. F. Manlove. The stable roommates problem with short
lists. In Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
(SAGT ’16), pages 207–219, 2016. → pp. 3, 4, and 5.
[22] M. J. A. N. C. de Condorcet. Essai sur l’application de l’analyse a` la probabilite´ des
de´cisions rendues a` la pluralite´ des voix. Paris: L’Imprimerie Royale, 1785. → p. 8.
[23] Y. Faenza, T. Kavitha, V. Powers, and X. Zhang. Popular matchings and limits to tractabil-
ity. In Proceedings of the 30th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
(SODA ’19), 2019. To appear. → pp. 4 and 8.
[24] T. Feder. Stable Networks and Product Graphs. PhD thesis, IBM Research Division,
Stanford, CA, USA, 1992. UMI Order No. GAX92-05628. → pp. 3 and 6.
[25] T. Feder. A new fixed point approach for stable networks and stable marriages. Journal
of Computer and System Sciences, 45(2):233–284, 1992. → pp. 4 and 5.
[26] A. Gai, D. Lebedev, F. Mathieu, F. de Montgolfier, J. Reynier, and L. Viennot. Acyclic
preference systems in P2P networks. In Proceedings of the 13th International Euro-Par
Conference, pages 825–834, 2007. → p. 1.
[27] D. Gale and L. S. Shapley. College admissions and the stability of marriage. The American
Mathematical Monthly, 120(5):386–391, 2013. → pp. 1 and 2.
[28] P. Ga¨rdenfors. Match making: Assignments based on bilateral preferences. Behavioural
Science, 20(3):166–173, 1975. → pp. 3 and 8.
[29] S. Gupta, S. Roy, S. Saurabh, and M. Zehavi. Balanced stable marriage: How close is close
enough? Technical report, arXiv:1707.09545 [cs.DS], 2017. → pp. 3 and 6.
[30] S. Gupta, S. Saurabh, and M. Zehavi. On treewidth and stable marriage. Technical report,
arXiv:1707.05404 [cs.DS], 2017. → p. 3.
[31] D. Gusfield. Three fast algorithms for four problems in stable marriage. SIAM Journal on
Computing, 16(1):111–128, 1987. → p. 3.
[32] D. Gusfield and R. W. Irving. The Stable marriage problem–Structure and algorithms.
Foundations of computing series. MIT Press, 1989. → pp. 1, 2, 3, and 4.
[33] M. M. Halldo´rsson, R. W. Irving, K. Iwama, D. Manlove, S. Miyazaki, Y. Morita, and
S. Scott. Approximability results for stable marriage problems with ties. Theoretical
Computer Science, 306(1-3):431–447, 2003. → pp. 3, 5, and 7.
12
[34] M. M. Halldo´rsson, K. Iwama, S. Miyazaki, and H. Yanagisawa. Improved approximation
results for the stable marriage problem. ACM Transactions on Algorithms, 3(3):30, 2007.
→ pp. 6 and 7.
[35] K. Hamada, K. Iwama, and S. Miyazaki. An improved approximation lower bound for
finding almost stable maximum matchings. Information Processing Letters, 109(18):1036–
1040, 2009. → p. 7.
[36] C.-C. Huang and T. Kavitha. Popular matchings in the stable marriage problem. Infor-
mation and Computation, 222:180–194, Jan. 2013. → pp. 3 and 8.
[37] A. Hylland and R. Zeckhauser. The efficient allocation of individuals to positions. Journal
of Political Economy, 87(2):293–314, 1979. → p. 1.
[38] R. W. Irving. An efficient algorithm for the ‘stable roommates’ problem. Journal of
Algorithms, 6(4):577–595, 1985. → pp. 2, 3, and 4.
[39] R. W. Irving. Stable marriage and indifference. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 48(3):
261––272, 1994. → pp. 2 and 3.
[40] R. W. Irving. Stable matching problems with exchange restrictions. Journal of Combina-
torial Optimization, 16(4):344–360, 2008. → pp. 3 and 6.
[41] R. W. Irving. Optimal stable marriage. In M. Kao, editor, Encyclopedia of Algorithms,
pages 1470–1473. Springer, 2016. → p. 1.
[42] R. W. Irving. Stable marriage. In M. Kao, editor, Encyclopedia of Algorithms, pages
2060–2064. Springer, 2016. → p. 1.
[43] R. W. Irving and D. Manlove. An 8/5-approximation algorithm for a hard variant of stable
marriage. In Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Computing and Combinatorics
Conference, pages 548–558, 2007. → p. 7.
[44] R. W. Irving, P. Leather, and D. Gusfield. An efficient algorithm for the ‘optimal’ stable
marriage. Journal of the ACM, 34(3):532–543, 1987. → pp. 3 and 5.
[45] R. W. Irving, D. Manlove, and G. O’Malley. Stable marriage with ties and bounded length
preference lists. Journal of Discrete Algorithms, 7(2):213–219, 2009. → pp. 3, 5, and 7.
[46] K. Iwama, S. Miyazaki, and N. Yamauchi. A (2− c(1/sqrt(n)))-approximation algorithm
for the stable marriage problem. Algorithmica, 51(3):342–356, 2008. → p. 7.
[47] K. Iwama, S. Miyazaki, and H. Yanagisawa. A 25/17-approximation algorithm for the
stable marriage problem with one-sided ties. Algorithmica, 68(3):758–775, 2014. → p. 7.
[48] A. Kato. Complexity of the sex-equal stable marriage problem. Japan Journal of Industrial
and Applied Mathematics, 1993. → pp. 3 and 6.
[49] D. Knuth. Mariages Stables. Les Presses de L’Universite´ de Montre´al, 1976. → p. 1.
[50] E. Kujansuu, T. Lindberg, and E. Ma¨kinen. The Stable Roommates problem and chess
tournament pairings. Divulgaciones Matema´ticas, 7(1):19–28, 1999. → p. 1.
[51] D. Lebedev, F. Mathieu, L. Viennot, A. Gai, J. Reynier, and F. de Montgolfier. On using
matching theory to understand P2P network design. In Proceedings of the International
Network Optimization Conference (INOC 2007), pages 1–7, 2007. → p. 1.
13
[52] D. Manlove. Hospitals/residents problem. In M. Kao, editor, Encyclopedia of Algorithms.
Springer, 2008. → p. 1.
[53] D. Manlove, R. W. Irving, K. Iwama, S. Miyazaki, and Y. Morita. Hard variants of stable
marriage. Theoretical Computer Science, 276(1-2):261–279, 2002. → pp. 3, 4, 5, and 7.
[54] D. F. Manlove. Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences, volume 2 of Series on Theo-
retical Computer Science. WorldScientific, 2013. → pp. 1 and 2.
[55] D. F. Manlove and G. O’Malley. Paired and altruistic kidney donation in the UK: Al-
gorithms and experimentation. ACM Journal of Experimental Algorithmics, 19(1), 2014.
→ p. 1.
[56] D. Marx and I. Schlotter. Parameterized complexity and local search approaches for the
stable marriage problem with ties. Algorithmica, 58(1):170–187, 2010. → pp. 5 and 7.
[57] E. McDermid and R. W. Irving. Sex-equal stable matchings: Complexity and exact algo-
rithms. Algorithmica, 68(3):545–570, 2014. → pp. 3 and 6.
[58] E. McDermid, C. T. Cheng, and I. Suzuki. Hardness results on the man-exchange stable
marriage problem with short preference lists. Information Processing Letters, 101(1):13–19,
2007. → pp. 3 and 6.
[59] P. Misra, S. Saurabh, and M. Zehavi. Popular matching in roommates setting is NP-
hard. In Proceedings of the 30th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
(SODA ’19), 2019. To appear. → pp. 4 and 8.
[60] B. Pittel and R. W. Irving. An upper bound for the solvability of a random stable room-
mates instance. Random Structures and Algorithms, 5(3):465–487, 1994. → p. 4.
[61] E. Ronn. NP-complete stable matching problems. Journal of Algorithms, 11(2):285–304,
1990. → pp. 2, 3, 4, and 6.
[62] A. E. Roth, T. So¨nmez, and M. U. U¨nver. Pairwise kidney exchange. Journal of Economic
Theory, 125(2):151–188, 2005. → p. 1.
[63] A. E. Roth, T. So¨nmez, and M. U. U¨nver. Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence of
wants in markets with compatibility-based preferences. American Economic Review, 97
(3):828–851, 2007. → p. 1.
[64] J. J. M. Tan. Stable matchings and stable partitions. International Journal of Computer
Mathematics, 39(1-2):11–12, 1991. → pp. 4 and 7.
14
